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Security discourses taking place in contemporary cities – in both developing and developed 
countries – feed defiance and legitimize an “urbanism of fear” based on controls that 
increase social and spatial segregation. Inversely, a sustainable city is an inclusive one 
capable of making a place for all kinds of people in a shared world. This is a plea for 
ambitious urban planning policies. 
 
A sustainable city is an inclusive city that accommodates all kinds and classes of people in a 
common world. By contrast, the current-day “security discourse” – the scaremongering 
language of politicians and the media – institutionalizes the way we think about public safety 
and legitimizes an “urbanism of fear” in most contemporary cities. In both developing and 
developed countries, a growing feeling of insecurity leads to increasing social and spatial 
segregation. The means of combating fears and insecurity force the separation – and even the 
destruction – of classic forms of urban cohesion, rendering the city both unbearable and 
unsustainable.  
 
In developed as well as developing countries, this ever more clamorous “security discourse” 
has two major consequences on the growth of cities, even as it obscures safety’s link to real 
delinquency: (1) certain fringes of the population, especially poor people and youths, are 
perceived as vectors of insecurity; and (2) planned urban redevelopment feeds an 
incontestable market of security systems and services. These two phenomena induce what we 
propose calling an “urbanism of fear,” where a series of socio-technical systems (or material 
devices, juridical norms, political institutions and social behaviour) splits the city apart 
socially and physically. These fear-based material and institutional settings produce a new 
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physical arrangement and social ordering of the city.1 A new urban order – an “archipelago of 
fear” – emerges, displacing the ideal of a modern city in which strangers can peacefully 
coexist in common public spaces. We will hypothesize that part of the violence in 
contemporary cities derives from the disdain and contempt inherent in these fear-based socio-
technical systems, due to the humiliation they engender on a daily basis. The city of fear thus 
appears profoundly intolerant and intolerable. 
 
Diversity Challenges Cities’ Sustainability 
  
In light of the increased mobility and heterogeneity that comes with globalization, urban 
social and territorial sustainability increasingly appears as a desideratum rather than a 
concrete project or cornerstone for organizing everyday systems and operations. 
Sustainability runs up against several complex realities, especially those improperly grouped 
together under the rubric “urban violence.” Delinquency, criminality, corruption and riots: 
these notions forge an idea of the city as a dangerous place, one that is soon “verified” by 
experience.  
 
We are thus witnessing an urbanism of fear emerge in cities of both developed and 
developing countries – a concept that owes as much (or more) to the police officer’s vision of 
the city as the architect’s.  
 
We are thus witnessing an urbanism of fear2 emerge in cities of both developed and 
developing countries – a concept that owes as much (or more) to the police officer’s vision of 
the city as the architect’s. Reactivating inclusive urban projects takes on new urgency: 
measures to ensure safety and reduce city-dwellers’ fears translate into urban planning and 
architectural operations “securing” increasing areas of city terrain, to the point that the market 
for security systems and services has become one of the most profitable ever. The 
fundamentally political task of making the city a safe place should not  carry the price of 
segregating or disdaining part of the population, or sacrificing the vision of an inclusive city. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Our	  inspirations	  here	  comes	  partly	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Michel	  Foucault	  and	  his	  concept	  of	  “dispositive”	  as	  an	  
heterogeneous	  set	  of	  narratives,	  institutions,	  architectural	  settings,	  laws,	  administrative	  decisions,	  moral	  
principles	  and	  so	  forth	  	  (Foucault	  1994).	  
2	  An	  analogy	  to	  Mike	  Davis’	  (1997)	  concept	  of	  “the	  ecology	  of	  fear.”	  See	  also	  Nan	  Ellin’s	  (1997)	  work	  on	  “the	  
architecture	  of	  fear.”	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Indeed, historically this tension between order and segregation is central to policy and urban 
planning work (Pattaroni 2007). 
 
Urban Order: Socio-Technical Systems to Open and Close the City 
 
The development of cities can be read as an evolution in the way various socio-technical 
systems place city dwellers in urban and social space, e.g. where they live, work, shop, play, 
meet and so forth. Over time, these material systems and the societal models they imply have 
changed in important ways. The ordering or placement of urban dwellers based on their 
social status gave way to ordering them based on the position of places themselves, and on 
the boundary between public and private spaces (Lofland 1973). The modern ideal of liberty 
and equality encouraged pacified public spaces open to all, even in cities highly segregated 
spatially (Box 1). The modern city’s founding ideal was to create a space where each person 
could be safe (among other things) independently of his or her status or income. This ideal 
rested on a number of political principles as well as congruent socio-technical systems: a state 
monopoly on violence (national police force), suppression of discriminatory regulations, and 
systems to facilitate “vulnerable” people’s mobility (children, the handicapped and old 
people). A culture of urban civility complemented the separation between public and private 
spaces; taking one’s place in the city depended upon a proven ability to respect others. 
 
The authorities lost their monopoly on violence to a very diverse array of private agents and 
security systems, all of which tend to fragment public spaces.  
 
Conversely, the gradual rise of the “magma of safety concerns” (Garcia-Sanchez 2006) stifles 
the goal of teaching civility to all citizens. Mechanical systems replace mutually civil 
conduct, through barriers, automatic security systems and other means of physical repression. 
In the bigger picture, this swing towards physical control matches the abandonment of the 
modern ideal of a city accessible to all. The authorities lost their monopoly on the legitimate 
use of violence to a very diverse array of private agents and security systems, all of which 
tend to fragment public spaces. These material controls diminish mobility and deprive large 
segments of the population of access to certain areas of the city. Potentially, this physical 
rather than civil control involves exposing people to danger: money – and sometimes status 
or membership in some community (ethnic, cultural, sexual) – becomes a requirement for 
safety. These transformations take place slowly but surely. In the space of a few years, 
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security discourses have generally given way to instituting this new urban order – territorial 
constellations whose appearance gives us the term “archipelagos of fear.”  
 
From Delinquency to Security Discourse 
 
Today, security policies feed a culture of mistrust and insecurity. This comes largely from the 
degree of uncertainty that separates real crimes – the ones that become news items in the 
daily papers – from the feeling of insecurity. In reality, a progression in such feeling rarely 
correlates with actual increases in delinquency: the feeling depends not only on “objective” 
facts, but also on the way a society thinks about the feelings’ progression and that of 
“delinquency” (Widner et al. 2004). It is obvious that many media outlets and political 
speeches play a significant role in developing a climate of insecurity, given that they usually 
focus on delinquency in an alarmist way, describing the perpetrators as unmanageable and 
incorrigible. In developed countries as much as developing ones, security discourses emerge 
that profoundly change social relationships within cities and their built environments.  
 
We are not trying to deny the reality of delinquency and urban violence here: “The 
probability of falling victim to an act of delinquency or violence is substantially higher in an 
urban area than a rural one” (SWC 2006-7:45). That said, the same study also notes that 
communities with a large excluded population “suffer a higher level of crime and violence 
than communities that are well connected to main roads and power structures” (SWC 2006-
7:45). Responding to urban insecurity is not sufficient; rather, it is also necessary to think 
about the links between insecurity and segregation. 
 
For more than twenty years, this atmosphere of insecurity has been created and maintained by 
both the media and public rumour 
 
Pedro Garcia-Sanchez shows how an “atmosphere of insecurity” has been created in Caracas  
(Garcia-Sanchez 2006: 128) since the late 1980s. Despite sometimes radical breaks in policy, 
both the media and public rumours have created and maintained this climate of fear – 
“bring[ing] up facts, scenarios, unfortunate incidents or advice on how to protect yourself 
from danger every day” by focusing discussion on major figures of small-time urban crime, 
bandits from poor neighbourhoods (Pedrazzini and Sanchez 1998). Next come multiple “civic 
security” associations that give shape to the security discourses and gradually include them in 
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everyday life. From then on, these converging narratives, scattered events, fears and fantasies 
establish confusion and anxiety in “the heart of public space” (Garcia-Sanchez 2006). The 
average citizen feeds off a feeling of insecurity that transforms his view of fellow citizens. 
Instead of maintaining a “civil indifference” for a passing stranger, keeping him at a distance 
while giving him a modicum of trust, he becomes suspicious. A real transformation of social 
ties within the city takes the form of “surveillance sociability.” The ties grow closer at the 
level of immediate neighbours –the people whom one “knows well” – while mistrust governs 
relations with the “stranger,” always seen, in an almost paranoid way, as a potential aggressor 
(Garcia-Sanchez 2006). 
 
From Security Discourse to an Urbanism of Fear 
 
The Caracas example shows how an increase in security discourses causes fear to spread and 
leads to a defensive reconfiguration of urban space. In particular, hundreds of barred control 
points with sentries (alcabalas residenciales urbanas) have sprung up in the city within ten or 
fifteen years, generally due to private initiatives, which restricted the physical mobility of 
residents. All kinds of gated residential communities have also appeared, from the simplest to 
the most sophisticated, as they have in many cities in developed and developing countries 
(see Caldeira 2000). 
 
This new arrangement of cities, driven by security discourses, results in the transformation of 
daily practices and judgments 
 
The barriers clearly draw an interior and an exterior space. There is no grey area between 
inhabitant and passer-by, but rather a relatively clear division between the inhabitant who is 
identified and therefore authorized, and the stranger who seems suspicious and must be kept 
at distance, barred from entry. The areas subject to these controls suffer from these practices 
despite their status as normally accessible public places: their inhabitants explain that even if 
they lack the right to prevent access by “strangers,” they try to make it “difficult to get 
through” (Garcia-Sanchez and Villa 2002:235). There is a negative appropriation3 or 
colonization of these spaces that defines the main outlines of a “private urbanism” (Garcia-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  We	  use	  the	  word	  “negative”	  here	  because,	  while	  one	  often	  “appropriates”	  the	  spaces	  one	  regularly	  
frequents,	  the	  question	  here	  is	  how	  far	  this	  “taking”	  is	  exclusive	  and	  inhospitable	  to	  other	  uses	  and	  people.	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Sanchez and Villa 2002). This new arrangement of cities, driven by security discourses, 
results in the transformation of daily practices and judgments. It feeds feelings of insecurity 
on one side, and increases feelings of social contempt and disrespect on the other.  
 
We are clearly witnessing the emergence of a market for security services in Venezuela; it 
started in the 1980s, especially during the terrible urban riots of 1989. The number of security 
companies exploded after that, going from 72 in 1987 to 509 in 1997, a 700% increase in ten 
years. This market’s most ostentatious effects are the proliferation of private police and 
security guards, and an exponential increase in the more or less professional installations of 
barriers, alarms and defences – cutting through urban and domestic space in every sense. 
 
The growth in the market for security services affects not only cities in developing countries. 
Indeed, it is even larger in developed-country cities: a 2000 evaluation revealed a 30% 
increase in the market for security, compared to an 8% increase in developing-country cities 
(GRHS 2007). In the United States, for example, the number of private “police” has exceeded 
the number of public police by three to one since the 1990s. In developed as well as 
developing countries, security is an enormous market: according to a 2006 survey, security 
providers’ sales reached €350 billion, a 9% increase over 2005 (Manach 2007).  
 
Urbanism’s Horizon of Violence 
 
Contemporary urban policies sin against residents through a double denial of recognition, 
refusing the most elementary rights and social esteem to some people 
 
While some city-dwellers understandably need to address their feelings of insecurity and the 
existence of genuine delinquency, many of the so-called solutions lead in one way or another 
toward a new “horizon of violence.” The German philosopher and sociologist Axel Honneth 
links contemporary ills to the denial of recognition, to “social contempt” (Honneth 2000). 
The denial can take three forms: the absence of love, of legal recognition, or of social esteem. 
In the absence of love and affection, a person loses self-confidence; in the absence of legal 
recognition, the basis of self-respect; and in the absence of political recognition, self-esteem. 
We thus depend on other people and institutions to fully exist and to lead satisfying lives. 
Institutions can therefore humiliate and deny recognition even when they are trying to be just 
(Margalit 1996). That denial underpins the reluctance of some people to claim their welfare 
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benefits, or their humiliation at being treated “like a number” – like a thing – by the 
bureaucracy (Margalit 1996). 
 
The “horizon of violence” of these institutional and material settings leads us to question not 
only the fairness of solutions, but also their decency, their avoidance of humiliation. 
(Margalit 1999). Contemporary urban policies sin against residents through a double denial 
of recognition, refusing the most elementary rights and social esteem in some cases. In 
France, this appears in the mistrust of immigrant Arab youth and the stigma attached to 
unemployed or illegal alien status. One response to humiliation is anger. When anger can be 
channelled into a critical voice, the response is sometimes denunciation. When anger cannot 
be channelled, it leads to violence.  
 
The Semantics of Fear 
 
The “semantics of fear” not only creates feelings of insecurity everywhere; it also leads to 
“demonizing” suspects and guilty parties (Garcia-Sanchez 2006). This changing view of 
delinquency figures prominently in most security discourses worldwide. It is especially 
prevalent in the United States, where the delinquent currently tends to be perceived as a 
fundamentally bad person – rather than as the product of a bad environment, formerly the 
prevalent view – who requires severe punishment because he or she is incorrigible. This is 
not a uniquely American discourse: research in Switzerland shows that the people who feel 
the least safe also have the most negative views of delinquents. Delinquency is perceived to 
be the result of an individual’s deviance – delinquents are “bad” or “disturbed “ – rather than 
a result of a social process (Widmer et al. 2004).  
 
The growing climate of insecurity seems to close the door on more measured analysis of 
delinquency and preventative policies. Fearful visions of reality appear suddenly and open 
the way for repression. In France, this fear emerges in popular views on what should be done 
about the poor suburbs (les banlieues) where many first- and second-generation immigrants 
live in social housing. According to Emanuel Renault (2002: 1), “analyses are performed 
through the prism of insecurity, so poor neighbourhoods are no longer seen as places of 
suffering so much as sanctuaries for illegal activities requiring a penal response.”  
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The precariousness or instability taking hold in French banlieues, and more generally in all 
large cities in developed countries, is that of “disaffiliation”  
 
The prism of insecurity erases social circumstances and denies the suffering of the people 
committing violent acts. The works cited here on humiliation and recognition prompt another 
reading of urban violence as well. If one listens to young people in French banlieues, one 
hears a recurring request for respect. These youths speak of a powerful feeling of social 
contempt that parallels the fear they themselves instil (Renault 2002). This sense of contempt 
arises from their experience of constant suspicion, and from the loss of the social and 
professional ties that are traditional sources of recognition. The precariousness or instability 
taking hold in French banlieues, and more generally in all large cities in developed countries, 
is that of “disaffiliation.” People become vulnerable when they they lose their jobs and social 
networks, and can no longer draw on these sources of recognition to counter the disdain of 
the dominant classes (Renault 2002:2). 
 
The establishment of a “watchful sociability” results in a powerful exclusion of the poorest 
and the stigmatized, who are denied recognition even by people from their own milieu. As 
they feel more useless, violence becomes more likely. The violence is not directed at living 
standards, but rather “against the vectors of social contempt, against the environment 
inasmuch as it imposes a degraded self-image” (Renault 2002:3). The resulting frustration 
erupts into the delinquency, petty crime and urban violence that appear on the evening news 
programmes.  
 
There is no direct link between poverty and violence. A whole set of intermediary 
mechanisms come into play, especially those linked to the experience of social and spatial 
inequality. More than the lack of money, the experience of “relative poverty” and frustrations 
associated with the loss of self-esteem appear to be the main drivers of urban violence. Thus, 
“inequality and exclusion exacerbate insecurity, which in return perpetuates a vicious cycle 
of poverty and violence” (SWC 2006-7: 145).  
 
Consequently, the current fight against urban fear means that real criminal events and those 
that merely increase feelings of insecurity receive the same treatment. In this light, even if 
there are currently “some reassuring signs of a decrease in levels of criminality in big cities” 
across the world (SWC 2006/7: 150), there is no parallel reduction of security discourses. Nor 
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has the trend towards an urbanism of fear abated, an urbanism allowing ample space to socio-
technical systems that segregate and materially exclude certain fringes of the population. 
Indeed, security policies seem like ineffective half measures, inflating the problem more than 
they reduce it. 
 
Are Archipelagos of Fear the New Shape of Urban Order? 
 
Given the foregoing, are we witnessing a new urban order that will replace the modern city 
constructed around an ideal of universally accessible public space? Architectural ramparts 
and boundaries permanently affect the built environment of the “defensive city.” The price of 
defensible landscapes and parcels explodes, even in times of crisis. The landscapes and 
material settings born of security urbanism emerge in very different social and territorial 
conditions and, while there is not yet a generic defensive city, the same models of security 
spaces take diverse forms the world over, e.g. gated communities, protected towers and 
guarded residences. This “globalized” model induces a fragmentation of urban space aimed at 
facilitating control. Once its public spaces have split into paradoxically private spaces, the 
city increasingly takes on the shape of an archipelago – one where each island is equipped 
with security systems according to its owner’s or renter’s affluence, and each island is also 
more easily policed from the exterior. That leads to a new socially and spatially polarized 
morphology of contemporary cities, dismembered into secure enclaves and poor ghettoes 
(Davis 1977).   
 
On one side, we have Disneyland transformed into Fort Apache. On the other side, the 
campfires of homeless people flicker throughout ruined city centres   
 
In modern and postcolonial urban societies, this fortification of social classes is not always 
perceived as a planned catastrophe, one that will eventually render any city – or any place – 
impossible and unsustainable. On the contrary, many leaders and urban residents seem 
convinced of its relevance or even its necessity. This principle of safety depends on a 
progressively defensive autonomy for some parts of the city, along with the inexorable 
abandonment of other increasingly vulnerable, but always more violent, parts of the city – 
more violent because lost in urgency and hopelessness. On one side, we have Disneyland 
transformed into Fort Apache. On the other side, the campfires of homeless people flicker 
throughout ruined city centres. Between them circulate police patrols, night watchmen and 
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secured roadways. Little remains in the middle anymore. Public spaces, streets, squares and 
markets that functioned as intermediate spaces disappear. These spaces are privatized “for 
reasons of safety,” or turned into wastelands reclaimed by the underclass. The progressive 
loss of “the street” – a public space gradually grown so deserted that walking one at night is 
suspect – arises from a planned strategy of privatization. It is a very serious loss indeed, for 
this was the space where the “classically” segregated city allowed rich and poor to cross 
paths and coexist. By contrast, in the manifold city now emerging, different classes can 
practically circulate “in parallel” within their reserved areas, moving in their own networks 
without being aware of adjacent ones GRHS 2003:22). 
 
Shopping centres reinvent the city by calming its fears, air-conditioning it, and populating it 
with polite salespeople and innocent buyers 
 
Even the disdained participate in the spatial prohibitions, and reinforce the boundaries of their 
ghettoes by tinkering with them. They too seek to experiment with the privatization of space 
for safety reasons. Entire blocks of social housing in the centre of Mexico City thus take on 
the look of veritable fortresses forbidden to strangers. That said, it is on the elites’ side of the 
city, known as “Luxury City” (Box 1), that this trend appears most clearly. The “city under 
surveillance” typified in such sites features three categories of space: one is residential, the 
second reserved for prisons and other detention centres, and the third used to construct secure 
commercial enclaves, managed and defended like autonomous territories. The quasi-military 
withdrawal of public spaces into shopping malls and athletic clubs, with their architectural 
and technological fortifications, is not solely a triumph of consumerism. Shopping centres 
reinvent the city by calming its fears, air-conditioning it, and populating it with polite 
salespeople and innocent buyers. 
 
Safety as a Luxury Product 
 
In a context of growing urban segregation, property privileges gradually give way to access 
privileges. Safety becomes a service and provides admittance to society; it is sold like a 
luxury product. The most striking recent buildings contribute to this urbanism of security. 
Examples run the gambit from the Torre Agbar by the French architect Jean Nouvel in 
Barcelona (2005), or the Archivo Distrital by the Columbian architect Rogelio Salmona in 
Bogotà (1990), to the Walt Disney Concert Hall (called “Death Wish” by Mike Davis) by the 
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American architect Frank Gehry (2003), and the renovated and secured Bunker Hill 
neighbourhood, both in Los Angeles (Davis, 1997). 
 
To classic urban fragmentation is added planned fragmentation of territory divided according 
to degrees of safety or danger 
 
To some degree, real estate developers also contribute to the materialization of fearful 
societies. It is not a given that their contribution means they subscribe to this ideology of 
security; it is more likely they simply respond to demand and make a good living doing so. 
Nonetheless, their technical talents have pushed the urbanism of fear towards a dramatic 
radicalization of the process of spatial segregation. To classic urban fragmentation, they now 
add planned fragmentation of territory divided according to degrees of safety or danger. It is 
striking to see how nearly all of the residential buildings in the city centre of Geneva, 
Switzerland, have closed-off their central entryways with numeric keypads. The paradox 
remains that all these systems to render the city more secure never really make it truly safer. 
The feeling of insecurity even seems to increase as the obsession with safety grows: as Mike 
Davis suggests, “The social perception of threat becomes a function of the security 
mobilization itself, not crime rates” (Davis 1997: 205). Furthermore, for the people excluded 
from secured spaces, the fragmentation of the urban environment may also entail an increase 




Thus, this urbanism of fear is also a frightening urbanism. By surfing the wave of insecurity, 
it produces an imaginary global geography: cities are generally perceived as barbaric in 
developing countries, but henceforth in large numbers of developed countries as well. People 
in cities are violent. Disorder reigns supreme. As the sociologist Zygmunt Baumann 
emphasizes, “Paradoxically, the cities originally constructed to provide safety for all their  
inhabitants are these days associated more often with danger than security” (Baumann 2003: 
29). The image as well as the practical form of the contemporary city induces a segregated 
universe where civil indifference – the minimal condition for peaceful urbanity – gives way 
to generalized mistrust.  
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The current urban condition therefore appears unsustainable because it signals the failure of 
the inclusive ideal of sustainable development. It is an economic failure because segregation 
and fear reduce the “competitiveness of cities” (SWC 2006/7: 147). It is a social failure 
because socio-spatial inequalities and barriers to mobility increase mistrust of other people, 
along with delinquency and violence. Furthermore, it is an environmental failure because an 
increase in slums makes it difficult to enforce ecological management (Berque et al. 2006). 
Conversely, an inclusive city should be able to calm security discourses and reintroduce the 
delinquent into the human community. It should promote an urbanism of recognition, capable 
of giving everyone a place in the city and the means to live the life to which he or she aspires. 
Such are the conditions for urban society’s future existence, in developed as well as 
developing countries.  
 
Box 1 Segregation and Urban Violence 
 
Urban segregation is not a new phenomenon; it is central to the modern Western city. 
Whereas rich and poor lived side-by-side in pre-industrial cities, an increasingly marked 
spatial segregation between classes accompanied the expansion of industrial cities. The 
pioneers of urban sociology4 in the first half of the twentieth century showed how 
competition between classes for the best usable locations drove the industrial city’s 
expansion. The result was a highly segregated city where different activities and classes 
occupied distinct areas. The “concentric” city described by the American sociologist Earnest 
Burgess is an exemplary illustration (Figure 1). Neo-classical economics spread this approach 
by explaining segregation as the result of an arbitrage between housing size and the cost of 




Classic Mechanisms and Forms of Segregation 
 
Nonetheless, mechanisms for adapting to market constraints alone have not accounted for 
segregation (GRHS 2003: 21). Another explanatory factor is the unequal distribution of 
territorial amenities, such as views, air quality and services. In general, poor people are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  American	  “Chicago	  School”	  of	  sociologists:	  Burgess,	  MacKenzie,	  Wirth,	  and	  so	  one.	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relegated to particularly disadvantageous areas, while investment focuses on sites that offer 
the best characteristics. Exclusionary zoning mechanisms linked to regulations and urban 
policies also play a role. Urban segregation can also be the result of willed processes or 
institutionalized discrimination, as with apartheid or the Jewish ghettos. “Zoned urbanism,” 
aimed at separating various everyday activities spatially, developed in the United States at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and then spread to Europe. It too was a powerful tool for 
separating the rich from the poor.  
 
However, there are many other global models for cities besides concentric circles. Some 
examples include the colonial city surrounded by walls, the “hollowed” city of Eastern 
Europe where raised buildings surrounded a lower city centre, or the “polycentric” 
automobile city of Southeast Asia. Each presents specific forms of segregation. 
 
Moving Toward a New Form of Segregation? 
 
A relatively original and common model of segregation has recently appeared internationally 
(GRHS,	  2001,	  2003,	  2007;	  SWC,	  2006/7). It usually takes the form of a fortified citadel and ties 
into the evolution of classic forms of segregation: zoning tends to disappear, and the spatial 
distance separating rich and poor dwindles. The gentrification process, characterized by the 
return of some higher-class people to poor areas in the city centre, illustrates this new mix. 
The large increase in gated communities5 could thus be “an indication that poor people and 
rich people are being brought closer to one another spatially” (GRHS 2003: 20). Spatial 
enclosures have the effect of keeping nearby people at a distance. This phenomenon is not 
uniform everywhere. Even though they appear almost everywhere in the world, gated 
communities are far more developed in the United States and Latin America than in Europe. 
One explanation for this is Europe’s tradition of strong public planning; by contrast,  Latin 
American cities are characterized by neo-liberal policies that allow private investors much 
more leeway (SWC 2006/7: 149-150). The contemporary city increasingly appears as a 
mosaic of different cities -cobbled together –  each made up of distinct networks of places, 
and frequented by specific populations who may co-exist without ever crossing paths. Thus, 
we see the luxury city, the gentrified city, the suburban city, the tenement city, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  As	  of	  2000,	  32	  million	  people	  lived	  in	  150,000	  gated	  communities	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  Guadalajara,	  
Mexico,	  gated	  communities	  take	  up	  10%	  of	  the	  land	  for	  2%	  of	  the	  population	  (SWC	  2006/07).	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abandoned city (GRHS 2001: 34). The model of “archipelagos of fear” described in this 
article seeks to comprehend this fragmentation. The main problem is not the existence of 
spatial segregation, but rather the gradual abandonment of spaces where milieus and classes 
can mingle. With this abandonment, a public space that symbolizes and facilitates a right to 
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